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In the early April 2009, the world was hit by H1N1 subtype of
Influenza A virus. The first outbreak occurred in Mexico, which then
spread to United States. On June 11, 2009, with the global contagious
spread of the novel influenza virus (H1N1) with 74 countries reporting
approximately 30,000 confirmed laboratory cases, the World Health
Organization, WHO raised the pandemic alert level to pandemic phase 6.
During the period, US reported 13,217 laboratory confirmed cases with 27
deaths, India 9 cases, China 174 cases and Nepal no cases of H1N1. As of
27 November 2009, more than 207 countries had reported the laboratory
confirmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 with a total death count of
more than 7,820. WHO reported heightened disease activity in US and
high ILI (Influenza like illness) cases in India and Nepal. With the arrival
of year 2010, as of 28 February, worldwide more than 213 countries
reported laboratory confirmed cases with at least 16,455 deaths. By the
time, most areas indicated declining disease activity, US indicated low
prevalence of influenza virus with low and declining pattern of pandemic
influenza activity, however, active transmission were observed in
Southeast Asia. According to WHO/SEARO, as of 2 February 2010,
Nepal has reported cumulative cases of 172 with 2 deaths. However, no
cases of H1N1 have been reported since that date. In the mean time the
candidate vaccine virus (CVV) has been developed, H1N1 vaccine now
has been manufactured, antiviral susceptible to the subtype been
identified. WHO is making an effort to distribute the donated H1N1
vaccines, antiviral and PPE (Personal Protection Equipment) to the
countries in need of vaccine.
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Introduction
Influenza usually causes an acute self-limiting upper respiratory tract
infection. The causative agent of influenza is “the Influenza A virus”. The
virus through continuous point mutation, a phenomenon called as
antigenic shift, can possibly generate the reassortant virus, bringing about
the potential pandemic. H1N1 2009 virus is a consequence of antigenic
shift, identified as a triple reassortant virus, developed as a result of
reassortment among swine, avian and human influenza strain, pigs acting
as the intermediate host or mixing vessels for gene reassortment among
strains. The transmission of swine flu occurs by inhalation of infectious air
borne droplets or droplet nuclei through direct or indirect contact. The
incubation period is 1-7 days. The symptoms include fever, cough, sore
throat, runny or stuffy nose, myalgia, body aches, headache, chills and
fatigue and occasional gastrointestinal upset with complication as
pneumonia, respiratory failure. The infection can further exacerbate with
rhabdomyolysis on renal failure, myocarditis on worsening of underlying
condition as asthma and cardiovascular disease on mixed infection with
bacteria. The other unusual symptoms reported are conjunctivitis,
parotitis, hemophagocytic syndrome. Individuals that are at high risk of
developing severe disease falls among the group of younger less than five
years, elderly people with suppressed immunity and pregnant women with
chronic systemic illnesses, adolescents on aspirin and immunecompromised patients with lower respiratory tract infection. Vulnerable
population includes children and young adults below the age of 65.
Diagnosis of H1N1 2009 pandemic virus is based upon three tests;
PCR/RT-PCR, viral culture and 4-fold rise in virus-specific neutralizing
antibodies. Control and prevention consist of isolation (social distancing),
good infection control practices (standard droplet and contact precaution,
practicing respiratory and hygiene etiquette), supportive care and use of
antiviral drugs as oseltamivir, zanamivir and peramivir, and immunization.
Nepal Influenza Pandemic Plans and Policies
To predict the proper measures to be taken in harmonizing the global
health with the emergence of the new influenza virus subtype capable of
uncertain pandemic threat, WHO has developed guidelines regarding the
preparedness and preventive measures and requires every country to
follow the guidelines in formulating national pandemic and response plans
plus implementing the measures effectively with regular monitoring. With
the emergence of H1N1 infection worldwide, the Government of Nepal
has considered the “National Avian Influenza and Influenza Pandemic
Preparedness and Response Plan” (NAIIPPRP), the plan developed in
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2005 to deal with the Avian Influenza. The main objective of NAIIPPRP
is to prepare the country for early recognition and containment of a
possible outbreak of avian influenza (AI), to reduce the risk of human
infection in the presence of animal disease and identifying and promptly
treating human influenza cases where they occur. In the event of human to
human transmission of H5N1 or other novel virus and a possible influenza
pandemic affecting Nepal, the plan aims at building preparedness to
contain it rapidly and mitigate its health and socio-economic impacts.
The NAIIPPRP provides a strong basis on which to detect and combat
possible outbreaks of AI and other related virus such as H1N1 that
occurred in 2009. The plan also outlines the institutional mechanisms for
carrying out those activities being candid about the capacity and resources
constraint associated with the country as low financial resources,
underdeveloped health care system, centralized planning and
administration, low health profile, low literacy rate with diminished
development in transportation and communication. The plan has detailed
various actions and improvement which need to be accomplished in the
health care system, under two main components, the Animal Health
component and the Human Health component. These components to
control and contain the Highly pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) mainly
focus on strengthening the surveillance and epidemiological Investigation,
strengthening animal and human quarantine services, strengthening the
capacity of the veterinary and human laboratory and its network,
improving public awareness information and communication, developing
health care delivery system preparedness and response plans, developing
compensation and rehabilitation.
The Government of Nepal, to implement the plan requested for the
World Bank assistance which was approved in 19 January 2007 with a
total grant of $18.2 million under a four year project plan, “Avian
Influenza Control project (AICP) – Nepal, 2007/08-2010/11”, which is
ongoing with a completion date of 31 July 2011. The goal of AICP is to
reduce the risk of human avian influenza infection in the presence of
animal disease, to be able to identify and treat promptly humans infected
with avian influenza, and to build preparedness to contain rapidly and
mitigate the health and socio-economic impact of an influenza pandemic
affecting Nepal. With the completion of the four year AICP, it is hoped
the health care system of Nepal will be enhanced so as to prevent, detect
and contain an avian influenza or related outbreaks.
Under the animal health component, the project will enhance AI
prevention and preparedness programs through strengthening the
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veterinary services, disease surveillance and diagnostic capacity. The
project will be focused on strengthening the laboratory capacity of one of
the eight animal disease diagnostic laboratories to BSL (Bio-safety level)
3 and the remaining seven to BSL 2. The project will focus on controlling
and containing the outbreak as well as providing compensation fund to
assist the poultry owners for their loss.
Under the human health component, the project aims to prevent the
human influenza caused by HPAI through enhanced year round
surveillance by strengthening the existing disease surveillance capacity at
the national, regional and district level. This will be accomplished by
building and implementing an influenza surveillance system on the
existing surveillance system and building the capacity to detect the
occurrence of human cases of avian influenza. Additionally, it calls for
providing and ensuring a laboratory network support at the health care
facilities to assist in implementation of the national influenza surveillance
system. This focuses on improving the laboratory capacity to enable
accurate and effective diagnosis and case detection with conventional and
real-time Polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and enzyme linked
immunosorbent assay (ELISA), developing virus isolation capabilities
(typing, subtyping and strain identification capacities). There is a need to
enhance BSL 3 capacity at NPHL (National Public Health Laboratory),
development of laboratory information management system and
appropriate trainings of personnel.
Under the prevention and containment measures, the project aims to
prevent avian and seasonal influenza transmission in high risk
occupational settings. This attempts to accomplish in developing a modern
human quarantine system in main points of international transit and
building the capacity for pharmacological and non-pharmacological
interventions as antivirals. PPE (Personal Protection Equipment) and
vaccination will need to be provided to the public plus information about
social distancing and monitoring the occurrence of infection during
different pandemic phases. This requires planning for the acquisition and
use of pandemic vaccines and developing a legal and regular framework
for public health interventions during epidemics.
Under the health care system delivery and preparedness response, the
project aims on developing and implementing a system of acute
respiratory disease triage and referral. Capacity building of the primary
health care system (district and below) together with the preparation and
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implementation of contingency plans is necessary to meet the health care
needs during an influenza pandemic.
The project also aims on enhancing the communication strategy to
ensure accurate information being relayed to the general public through
the resources available. Nepal government, with the progress on ongoing
AICP on overcoming the constraint associated with the health care system
is modifying the NAIIPPRP. According to WHO-SEARO, with the
ongoing H1N1 pandemic, Nepal has developed the first draft of the
revised NAIIPPRP under the heading “Avian Influenza Pandemic
Preparedness and Response Plan for Government of Nepal, (AIPPRP)”.
Mitigation Measures and Controversial Scenario
According to the press release made by MoHP, with the pandemic
alert 5 declaration on 28 April 2009, the Government of Nepal initiated
the following activities:
a. Conducted series of planning and coordination meeting with various
line ministries, departments and other stakeholders.
b. All district health offices and regional health directorates were alerted
on influenza like illnesses surveillance. Trainings events were
conducted on surveillance, case management, infection control and
community mitigation to health workers and other relevant people at
central, regional and district levels.
c. Initiated surveillance activity and health screening at Tribhuvan
International Airport on 29 April, 2009 and major land crossing (India
and China border).
d. Developed and circulated guidelines on who should get laboratory test;
who should seek immediate medical care; and who should get
antiviral.
e. Public and private hospitals including security forces hospitals have
been instructed to establish an isolation room. Control Room is
established at Epidemiology and Disease Control Division (EDCD).
f. Standard Operating Procedures on patient management have been
circulated widely to all hospitals. The community mitigation and
health promotion materials have been disseminated to the community.
g. Media messages on H1N1 and preventive measures have been
disseminated to the general public. Risk communication templates and
leaflets (Flu Dos and Don’ts) have been distributed to all districts.
h. Laboratory capacity was strengthened to carry out the testing of H1N1
in NPHL. International and National trainings have been provided to
Laboratory person to conduct testing of H1N1.
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i. Nepal government in coordination with WHO, is scheduled to receive
vaccine in the first quarter of 2010
No cases as of 11 June 2009: Government of Nepal with porous IndoNepal border, and country sheltering the refugees with the incidence of
H1N1 infection in neighboring countries and country’s associated capacity
constraint and lack of transparency regarding the improvement in the
health care system with low health profile and nutritional status, poor
sanitary condition and hygiene etiquette, is highly prone to contagious
airborne infection. However, with neighbor countries reporting confirmed
cases of H1N1, Nepal had not reported any cases as of 11 June 2009.
H1N1 influenza, being a contagious airborne disease, no borders or
boundaries can prevent its spread. No cases indicate a high health profile
and advanced health care system in Nepal. However, considering the facts
of Nepal and the characteristics of H1N1 infection, the report does not
seem to convey accurate information.
Surveillance activity and effectiveness: The face that no cases were
reported as of 11 June 2009 raises questions regarding the surveillance
activities and its effectiveness. Screening at the International airport
though revealed the identification of the first three cases on 28 June 2009,
screening done on the borders still remain under question indicating
ineffective and inadequate surveillance with no cases among the massive
mobility population entering and exiting the country at these levels. The
government of Nepal has not made public information about the
surveillance being done on pig farming regarding H1N1 and probable
cases.
Diagnostic capability of Nepal: The Government of Nepal had
reported confirmed cases on the basis of report submitted by NPHL.
Strengthening the laboratory capacity of NPHL is one of the main aspects
of AICP. The AICP focuses on three staged development of the NPHL.
The first phase is distribution and use of rapid antigen detection kits, the
second phase involves use of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods,
and the third involves virus isolation and tissue culture, the development
of BSL facilities.
According to AICP, strategic and operational plan 2006, NPHL has
basic laboratory equipment, much of which is substandard, outdated, and
unreliable. NPHL is limited to performing rapid tests distinguishing
influenza A and B virus only. Though the laboratory is equipped with
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PCR equipment and can perform conventional PCR for other organisms. It
is in need of reagents, chemicals, and accessories to do conventional PCR
for influenza. To perform the more reliable and sensitive test of detection,
the real-time PCR (RT-PCR), NPHL will require facilities renovations
necessary to do PCR testing and the training needs together with need of
equipments, primers, reagents, supplies, and accessories and laboratory
management information system, and computer equipment to run and
interpret PCR. However, BSL-3 is a long term goal and requires facility
renovations, equipment, and supplies necessary for BSL-3, training to
operate such a facility, and personnel requirements.
According to WHO report, 13 May 2009, Nepal was not listed as one
of the countries able to perform PCR to diagnose influenza A (H1N1)
virus infections in human. According to the report of the WHO/SEARO,
partners meeting on H1N1 2009 at New Delhi on 21 August 2009, Nepal
does not have Influenza center lab (ICL) capable of virus isolation,
PCR.WHO has guided the nation to report confirmed cases as per three
confirmatory tests result; PCR, viral culture and serology test, 4 fold rise
in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus virus-specific neutralizing antibodies.
WHO has guided countries without a designated National Influenza
Center (NIC), with no ongoing influenza surveillance activities or with no
laboratory capacity to diagnose the pandemic H1N1 2009 influenza virus
to collect representative samples from clinically compatible cases from
newly affected areas and among severe cases per week and send to
neighboring countries or regional influenza laboratories with laboratory
capacity for virus characterization.
The laboratory confirmation report of H1N1 cases from NPHL
requires transparency, so as to assure the public regarding the
improvement on the diagnostic capabilities of NPHL and the type of test
being implemented or collaboration with certain national private or
international organization for confirmation. The government of Nepal, in
order to assure improved health care system requires having some degree
of transparency to gain public confidence.
Immunization program: The government of Nepal has not initiated any
vaccination program as it is still awaiting vaccine deployment from WHO.
By now the country should have been ready for the next pandemic wave
with effective immunization program and stockpiling in hand of antiviral
and appropriate personal protection equipment, however claims to be
ready for pandemic wave.
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Total H1N1 cases identified: According to WHO/SEARO, Nepal has
reported cumulative cases of 172 with 2 deaths as of 2 February 2010. No
cases of H1N1 have been reported since that date when WHO is reporting
increasing incidence of H1N1 in Southeast Asia. The cases cannot be
taken as the actual cases when the surveillance measures and diagnostic
tools applied are in question for the effectiveness.
Efficacy of the mitigation measures applied apart from AI incidence
place: With the pandemic preparedness on hand from AICP and existing
plans and programs implemented to deal with the January and February
2009 AI pandemic in Jhapa and Morang district, the government of Nepal
initiated the mitigation measures. The national action preparedness plan
and the mitigation measures applied seems to correlate with each other as
per the activities been addressed by the MoHP. However, the efficacy of
the measures applied remains in question regarding other areas of Nepal
where no sign of AI have been observed.
Conclusion
Nepal with capacity constraint, low financial resources, low manpower
and limited technology, political instability has undergone challenges to
implement a plan. Issues such as an under-developed health care system,
the topography of the country, economic remoteness, difficulties in
enhancing literacy among the female and rural populations, conservative
social custom and traditions and centralized planning and administration
has contributed to the implementation problems. The Avian Influenza
Control Project (AICP) has made an endeavored to improve and
implement mitigation measures to deal with the H1N1. However due to
existing challenges; country’s associated constraints and uncertainty in the
development of the health care system, the capability enhancement and
effectiveness of the diagnostic laboratory, National Public Health
Laboratory and the surveillance measures implemented, issues following
the mitigation measures applied remains. Transparency to gain public
confidence and assure the citizens of their safety and capability
enhancement in the health sector is necessary.
Until the NPHL capacity is enhanced or collaboration with national
private or international organization for diagnosis question about Nepal
has a high health profile or is immunized to the subtype will continue.
Transparency and open communication regarding the capabilities of the
government needs to occur. Furthermore, the method of surveillance will
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be impeded. Screening of swine operation should be implemented. Table
top or field exercise of pandemic planning should occur. No immunization
campaign has been implemented and the country is still awaiting vaccine
deployment from WHO which indicates management and leadership
issues, contributing to a lack of effective mitigation measures. With WHO
continuing to report additional cases in Southeast Asia, continue vigilance
and reporting in Nepal should occur. The government of Nepal however
needs to be better prepared for the unpredictable pandemic threat and its
consequences.
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